Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia

Explorations in the Intellectual History
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The Languages of Science in Early Modern India

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An important factor in the modernization of the production and dissemination of knowledge in Europe was the transformation, beginning in the seventeenth century, of the vernaculars into languages of science and the eventual displacement of long-dominant Latin. By contrast, although South Asia had known a history of vernacularization in the domain of expressive textuality (*kāvya*, "literature") astonishingly comparable to that of Europe, Sanskrit persisted as the exclusive medium of communication outside the Persianate cultural sphere for many areas of science, systematic thought, and scholarship more generally until the consolidation of colonial rule in the nineteenth century. This is a puzzling and arguably a consequential difference in the histories of their respective modernities.

The problem of the relationship between knowledge forms and language choice has a long history in India, beginning with the multiple linguistic preferences shown by Buddhists until Sanskrit gained ascendancy in the early centuries of the Common Era. I address some of this premodern history elsewhere.[1] Here I want to situate the problem of language and science more narrowly conceived within the context of the collaborative research project in which I first formulated it, and that has something to do with the descriptor "early modern" in my title. I then reflect briefly on what we might mean by the category *science* (or *systematic knowledge* or *learning*) in this period and in its relationship to the complex "question of the language" with its two kinds of concerns, epistemological and social.[2] After delineating the boundaries of language choice in a number of specific intellectual disciplines and vernaculars, I look more closely at one tradition, that of Brajbhasha. I then review some of the presuppositions in Sanskrit language philosophy that may have militated against the vernacularization of intellectual discourse. A useful orientation here, which summarizes the dominant position of early modern Sanskrit

intellectuals, is offered by *mīmāṃsā* (discourse analysis and scriptural herme-
neutics), in particular the work of Khaṇḍadeva, the discipline's foremost ex-
ponent in mid-seventeenth-century Varanasi. I end by drawing and weighing
some contrasts with the case of Europe.

It bears remarking at once how thoroughly the question of the medium of
intellectual discourse in early modern India has been ignored in scholarship.
Thanks to the work of Frits Staal and others, we may understand something of
the discursive styles of the "Sanskrit of science."[3] But we still understand next
to nothing of its ideology or sociology, let alone how this might compare to
other cultural formations contemporaneous with it. These are obviously vast
and complex issues, and it is not possible in this brief space to offer more than
a brisk and tentative sketch.

Knowledge Systems on the Eve of Colonialism

The collaborative research project of this name that forms the context for
the thematic of the languages of science aims to investigate the substance
and social life of Sanskrit learning from about 1550 to 1750 across four geo-
graphical areas and seven intellectual disciplines.[4] As for the time boundaries,
the endpoint is set by the consolidation of colonial domination in our spatial
foci (Bengal 1764; Tanjavur 1799; Varanasi 1803; Maharashtra in the course
of the following decade). Somewhat more arbitrary is the starting point. It
was certainly not meant to be hard and fast, and it has become clear that
different knowledge systems followed different historical rhythms. But in
many ways the work of the logician Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in the north and
the polymath Appayya Dīkṣita in the south (both fl. ca. 1550) marked some-
thing of an intellectual and historical rupture that we are only now beginning
to understand.[5] The spatial boundaries are similarly somewhat flexible, but to
the degree possible attention is being concentrated on trying to understand
the varying conditions of intellectual production in what are, in sociopolitical
terms, very different regional complexes (Delhi/Varanasi, Tanjavur/Madurai,
Mithila/Navadvip, and Maharashtra). In addition to these time-space limits,
the project restricts itself to seven disciplines: *vyākaraṇa* (language analysis),
mīmāṃsā, nyāya (logic and epistemology), *dharmaśāstra* (law and moral phi-
losophy, broadly speaking), *alaṅkāraśāstra* (poetics), *āyurveda* (life science),
and *jyotiḥśāstra* (astral science). These have been selected for their centrality
to Sanskrit culture (language and discourse analysis), for their comparative
and historical value (life and astral sciences), or for the new vitality the sys-

tem seems to have demonstrated during these centuries (logic and episte-mology).[6]

The Eve of Colonialism project is at once self-contained and preparatory to a comparative history, first with Indo-Persian and vernacular scholarship of the sort offered in this volume, and second, more grandly, with European and other Asian systems of thought.[7] It was largely a matter of pragmatic method, intuition, and professional orientation that the project was originally orga-nized according to language, first Sanskrit and eventually Persian and vernacu-lar. The decision to concentrate initially on Sanskrit was made also because it appeared that the Indian knowledge systems of the period were in fact con-centrated in Sanskrit. But is that impression more than an appearance? Was science in the period 1550–1750 in fact restricted to production in the San-skrit language (outside the Persianate sphere, that is), and if so, why was it restricted and with what consequences? More generally, has language choice in India (or anywhere else) ever been pertinent to the production of science, systematic thought, and scholarship, and if so, how and to what degree?

Science and Language in Premodern India

Before the problem of the relationship of language and science can even be raised we need to ask what is meant by *science*. This is no easy question to answer, however, for the intellectual history of premodern South Asia, or in-deed for that of the West. As recently as 1993 European scholars were bemoan-ing the fact that there existed "no critical discussion of the changing meaning of the word 'science'" in the West; in fact an important recent collection on science and language in Europe over the past four centuries evinces astonish-ing indifference to the historical semantics of the term that defines the book's very problematic.[8] The situation is hardly less acute in South Asian scholar-ship. *Science, systematic knowledge, scholarship, learning* (as well as *rule* and even *scripture*) would all be legitimately translated by the Sanskrit word *śāstra*. But what exactly is *śāstra*, and how does it relate to other, kindred concepts, such as *jñāna* (and *vijñāna*) and *vidyā* (all variously translated as knowledge, learn-ing, scholarship . . . and science)? The English word *science* points to no natu-ral kind but is a worrisomely pliable signifier, indeed almost a talisman (wit-ness *Christian science* or *creation science* or *political science*), and clearly it is no straightforward matter to map onto it the congeries of terms and texts and intellectual practices we find in India during the two or three centuries before colonialism.

At the same time we must address a certain circularity, for traditional India, that presents itself in the very formulation of the central problem of this essay. If, from a long-term perspective, *science*, whether as *jñāna* in the sense of comprehension or *śāstra* in the sense of system, is simply *knowledge*—Sanskrit *veda* (from the root *vid*, "to know")—then science can have been expressed *only* in the Sanskrit language. This is surely one implication of the discourse on the *vidyāsthānas*; these fourteen (later eighteen) "knowledge sources" or disciplines, which were held to exhaust the realm of systematic thought, all derive their truth from their relationship to Vedic revelation. As the *Yājñvalkyasmṛti* expresses it, "No *śāstra* exists other than the Veda-*śāstra*; every *śāstra* springs from it."[9] Accordingly throughout much of Indian history new—or, ipso facto, counter—*śāstra* (or *jñāna* or *vidyā*) required new or counter language, beginning with the *śāstra* comprised of the teachings of the Buddha, composed originally in Gandhari and other local languages in the north and Pali in the south.

This apparently general cultural presupposition finds an echo in the widespread commitment to a postulate of Sanskrit language ideology: correct language is required for the correct communication of reality (science). This idea is at least as old as the seventh century, when Kumārila, the great scholar of *mīmāṃsā*, argued "The scriptures of the Śākyas [Buddhists] and Jains are composed in overwhelmingly corrupt language [*asādhuśabdabhūyiṣṭha*]—with words of the Magadha or Dakshinatya languages or their even more dialectal forms [*tadapabhraṃśa*]. And because of their false composition [*asannibandhanatva*], they cannot be considered science [*śāstratvaṃ na pratīyate*]. . . . When their words are false [*asatyaśabda*] how could their doctrines ever be true [*arthasatyatā*]? . . . That the Veda, on the other hand, is an autonomous source of true knowledge is vouchsafed by its very form [*rūpād eva*]."[10] Kumārila is entirely typical in his view on the relationship between "correct" language, Sanskrit, and truth, and in his conviction that only Sanskrit can articulate reality and thus be the sole medium for science. Even the Indian Buddhists eventually agreed after all, adopting Sanskrit for all their writings from the first or second century onward. And this position was one *mīmāṃsakas* such as Dinakara Bhaṭṭa (fl. 1625) were still endorsing a millennium later: "The remembered Vedic text [*smṛti*] that restricts usage to grammatically correct language [i.e., Sanskrit]—the one that enjoins us to 'Use only correct words, not incorrect ones' [*sādhūn evābhibhāṣeta nāsādhūn*]—derives its authority from the extant Vedic text [*śruti*] requiring one to speak the truth and to avoid lies."[11]

A language ideology of this sort is not, to be sure, peculiar to Sanskrit intellectuals: for Derrida, only Greek can really speak philosophy, for Heidegger, only German. But Sanskrit intellectuals based their view on a far more explicitly enunciated theory, one that I examine in what follows. Some continuing energies from their various postulates and the quest for an ever more perfect fit between language and things — for an ever more Sanskritic Sanskrit — may also have conditioned one of the most far-reaching developments in early modern intellectual life: the fashioning of a new idiolect by *navyanyāya* (new logic), beginning around the fourteenth century, that was to profoundly influence discursive style across disciplines and regions. Indeed exploiting to an extreme degree linguistic capacities with which Sanskrit is especially well endowed (in particular nominal compounding), this philosophical register would make the transition to science and scholarship in vernacular languages even more difficult than language ideology already had. Sanskrit scientific thought had long been not only thought in Sanskrit but thought about Sanskrit, about the nature of this particular language and its attributes. (It is, for example, no easy thing to discuss *mīmāṃsā's* concern with deontic verbal morphemes [*vidhi liṅ*] or possessive qualifiers [e.g., *matup*] in languages that lack them.) This was the tendency that *navyanyāya*, with its invention of a new philosophical vocabulary — far vaster than, say, the poststructuralist gallicization of English — exaggerated to the point of untranslatability, even unintelligibility.[12] And there are other elements of language ideology, in addition to the linkage between language that is correct or true (*sādhu* or *sat*) and the truth itself (*satya*), that I address separately below.

Let us be more empirical for a moment, however, and examine the language practices of science understood as broadly as possible. Were there forms of systematic knowledge that were never communicated in vernacular texts prior to the colonial age?

Consider first the Indian *vidyātraya* of *pada*, *vākya*, and *pramāṇa*, the "triple science" of words, sentences, and grounds of knowledge, which, whatever its status in earlier times, had by the seventeenth century become an actual ideal of intellectual perfection. (Every scholar now claimed for himself the sonorous title *padavākyapramāṇapārāvārapārīṇadhurīṇa*, "able to cross to the further shore of the ocean of grammar, hermeneutics, and epistemology.") No synthetic work on the question of language medium in these disciplines has ever been done, but an informal survey suggests strongly that access to them was attainable only through Sanskrit. Both *nyāya*, the *pramāṇaśāstra* (along with the larger questions of epistemology), and *mīmāṃsā*, the *vākyaśāstra*,

were entirely untouched by vernacularization. I have been unable to locate a single premodern work in either field in any regional language, except for the occasional and very late, almost certainly colonial-era, translation.

The vernacular history of grammar and the related disciplines of poetics, metrics, and lexicography, is somewhat anomalous, and it also presents a significant, and puzzling, unevenness between north and south India. Philology (to use that term as the general disciplinary rubric of these arts) swept across most of south India more or less simultaneously. The Kannada tradition commenced in the late ninth century with an important text encompassing grammar and poetics, the *Kavirājamārga* of Śrīvijaya, which was quickly followed by elementary grammatical (and lexicographical and prosodical) works leading to one of the most sophisticated descriptions of a vernacular language in the premodern world, the *Śabdamaṇidarpaṇa* of Kēśirāja (mid-thirteenth century).[13] This philological activity continued into the seventeenth century with the *Śabdānuśāsana* of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka Deva (a grammar, written in Sanskrit, of the classical idiom of Kannada, which had become obsolete by the thirteenth or fourteenth century), but then mysteriously vanished. Developments in Tamil are more or less contemporaneous with Kannada; leaving aside the undatable *Tolkāppiam*,[14] these include the grammar *Naṉṉūl* by Pavaṇanti (early thirteenth century), the more strictly poetics texts *Vīracōḻiyakkārikai* (ca. 1063–69) and *Taṇṭiyalaṅkāra* (somewhat earlier), and a plethora of dictionaries produced continuously from around the eighth or ninth century into the eighteenth. Telugu philology begins only slightly later, with the appearance of important grammatical works from the thirteenth century onward (*Āndhrabhāṣābhūṣaṇamu* of Kētana, thirteenth century, and *Āndhraśabdacintāmaṇi* ascribed to the eleventh-century poet Nannaya but more likely authored by Appakavi in the last quarter of the sixteenth century).[15]

Wholly different is the situation in the north, where vernacular languages without exception remained untouched by formal grammaticization until the coming of the new colonial order of knowledge. A striking instance of this negative dynamic is Marathi. The language was conceptually objectified by the late tenth century and became the vehicle for expressive literature by the thirteenth. Four centuries later it was continually being adduced by Maharashtra-born scholars when glossing Sanskrit texts (a good example is the great *Mahābhārata* commentator Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara, fl. 1675), a sure sign of its primacy among their readership. Yet systematic reflection on Marathi grammar (and lexicon and prosody) is, with one exiguous exception, entirely absent before the coming of European science—a fact made doubly paradoxical by the fact that it was in Maharashtra, where Marathi is the domi-

nant language, that the cultivation of Sanskrit grammatical studies attained the greatest brilliance in early modern India.[16] The same holds for poetics, which found no vernacular expression in the north except (admittedly a big exception) in the Brajbhasha appropriation of Sanskrit *alaṅkāraśāstra*.[17]

The almost total—and in some regions total—linguistic monopolization by Sanskrit over the three primary disciplines of grammar, hermeneutics, and logic and epistemology tallies with the evidence from many other areas of systematic knowledge. Again this question awaits detailed study, but some first observations are likely to be borne out by further work. In law (*dharmaśāstra*) vernacular works are exceedingly rare; there may well be more than the *Vijñāneśvariyamu*, a Telugu adaptation by Kētana of the celebrated Sanskrit work produced in Kannada country in the twelfth century, but that is all I have ever encountered.[18] In the field of life science (*āyurveda*), to take a second example, matters are somewhat less clear, but Sanskrit certainly appears to have maintained a statistical dominance in some areas until the second half of the eighteenth century. At which point, for reasons that await explanation, medical authors began to produce their discourses in more than one language, but this remained an occasional practice.[19]

Vernacular philosophical and religious poetry might seem to offer counterevidence to the overall pattern, for the genre is not only common but sometimes foundational to a regional tradition. Again Marathi offers an interesting case, with the (possibly) thirteenth-century *Vivekasindhu* of Mukundarāja presenting a remarkably precocious example of vernacular Advaita-vedantic exposition, and the near contemporary work of Jñāneśvara, the *Bhāvārthadīpikā*, providing an equally precocious example of vernacular philosophical and poetic commentary.[20] Similarly Śrīvaiṣṇava theology was composed in a new Sanskrit-Tamil register (*maṇipravāḷa*) in Tamil country, and Vīraśaiva theology in Kannada (and sometimes Telugu) in the Deccan. And yet these kinds of works do not really constitute an exception to the general rule of the language of science and its broader norms that, with the Hinduization of Sanskrit in the present age, we are apt to forget: the vehicle of organized, systematic *laukika*, or this-worldly, knowledge before colonialism was Sanskrit, while the regional languages, at least in their incarnation as literary idioms, were in the first instance the voice of *alaukika*, or other-worldly, wisdom (a situation closely paralleled by Latin and the European vernaculars).[21] To make this distinction is not to value information over imagination or to unjustly narrow the scope of the *śāstra*; it is simply to describe a historical division of language labor that was highly influential. By and large, *systematic knowledge* remained the preserve of Sanskrit, the literary and spiritual the preserve of the vernacu-

lars, outside the Persianate world. Indeed that is precisely how the Persianate world understood the situation: Mīrzā Khān, in his remarkable overview of Brajbhasha, *Tuḥfat al Hind* (ca. 1675), defines "Sahāskirt" as the language in which "books on various sciences and arts are mostly composed."[22]

The general tendencies in learning and language suggested by these data are fully corroborated for a language tradition that I want to look at in a little more detail, Brajbhasha, the language that supplemented, and then effectively replaced, Sanskrit as the transregional literary code in north India during the early modern era.

The Language of Braj beyond the Literary

Brajbhasha is an important and especially good case to study for the problematic of language and science.[23] Although the history of nonliterary Old Hindi has never been written—all the important survey works entirely ignore such materials—the resources for doing so exist in abundance and are comparatively well ordered. These include the various manuscript catalogues compiled as a result of intensive searches in the early part of the twentieth century, including the three-volume manuscript catalogue published by the Nagari Pracharini Sabha that lists according to genre nearly forty-five hundred works (culled from a five-volume *Khoj* series).[24] While it is admittedly hazardous to draw large conclusions from one survey of manuscripts, however systematically prepared—let alone historical conclusions, since the majority of the manuscripts are undated—it does seem significant that upwards of *70 percent* of these are texts we would broadly classify as expressive, imaginative, literary, and religious. Of the remaining quarter, the greater part (five hundred or so) deal with practical arts: *jyotiṣ* (astrology), *śakun* (augury), *śālihotra* (veterinary science), *sāmudrikaśāstra* (physiognomy), and the like; religious practices, including works on *karmavipāk* (karma theory), *māhātmya* or *vrat* (sacred topography, religious vows), *stotra* (hymnody), *tantra, mantra, yantra,* or *indrajāl* (mystical and magical arts), and gnomic wisdom (versions of the Sanskrit classics *Hitopadeśa* and *Pañcatantra*).[25] Works that concern themselves with *darśana* (the philosophical viewpoints) are conspicuous for their rarity.[26] The only areas of growth for Brajbhasha scientific textuality in the early modern period are *āyurved* (forty-eight manuscripts) and the adjacent field of *kāmaśāstra*, or erotology (numerous examples of *Kokaśāstra* manuscripts). Once again specific exceptions tend to prove a general rule.

Brajbhasha shows a remarkable and relatively early development of a sci-

ence of poetics (which is as noted strikingly absent in every other north Indian vernacular tradition). The two foundational works of Keśavdās, *Kavipriyā* and *Rasikapriyā* (ca. 1600), were preceded by a certain kind of philological interest absent elsewhere in north India (indicated by, among other texts, the *Mānmañjarī*, a thesaurus composed by Nandadās ca. 1550) and succeeded by attempts toward a more fully systematized discipline (as visible in the works of Cintāmaṇi, fl. 1650, and Bikhārīdās, fl. 1730).[27] But again grammatical analysis remains completely nonexistent. Some works of spiritual reflection were composed in Brajbhasha prose, including a *guruśiṣyasaṃvād* (teacher-student dialogue) titled *Siddāntabodh* by Jaswant Singh, king of Jodhpur (1667; what appear to be comparable texts are noted in Hindi manuscript catalogues).[28] A tradition of expository prose in the form of commentaries began with Indrajit, king of Orchha (ca. 1600), who commented on two of the *Śatakas* of Bhartṛhari; especially noteworthy are commentaries, something on the order of fifty, on the works of Keśavdās. As indicated by Indrajit, Jaswant Singh, and many others (including Rāyasiṃha, king of Bīkāner ca. 1600, to whom is attributed a Rajasthani commentary on an astronomical text, Śrīpati's *Jyotiṣaratnamālā*), courtly notables played a prominent role in the creation of a vernacular scholarly idiom.[29] This merits further scrutiny, as indeed does premodern vernacular literary commentary itself, especially from a comparative perspective. (In Kannada and Telugu, for example, virtually none exists before the modern period.)

Science did find expression in Brajbhasha, then, but in a highly restricted sense. Something of this constrained character of vernacular knowledge production is illustrated by the career of one of the more interesting seventeenth-century scholars, Kavīndrācārya Sarasvatī (ca. 1600–1675).[30] A Maharashtrian cleric, Kavīndra, according to François Bernier (and there can be little doubt that the reference is to him), was Dārā Shikoh's chief Sanskrit scholar, "one of the most celebrated pandits in all the *Indies*," and later Bernier's constant companion over a period of three years. He was a familiar at the court of the Mughal emperor Shāh Jahān, who conferred on him the title "Hoard of All Knowledge" and provided him with a rich annuity enabling him to assemble one of the most celebrated Sanskrit libraries of the day. (Many of the manuscripts, recopied expressly for Kavīndra's collection, are today to be found in the Anup Sanskrit Library Bikaner, the Library of the Maharaja of Jammu, and the Sarasvati Bhavan, Varanasi.) Kavīndra's extant work in Sanskrit consists largely of commentaries on Vedic and classical texts, but one could argue that, historically viewed, his more remarkable contribution—less for its intellectual originality than for its sociolinguistic symbolism—was to Brajbhasha.

Indeed the very fact that he wrote in Braj is remarkable. So far as I can tell—a provisional claim that sounds too extreme to be true, though it is borne out by materials currently available to me—he is the single Sanskrit scholar in the intellectually vibrant world of seventeenth-century Varanasi to have written in the vernacular.[31] But his relationship to the vernacular was conflicted. His most important work is the *Bhāṣāyogavāsiṣṭhasār* (also known as *Jñānsār*), a version of the anonymous Sanskrit *Laghuyogavāsiṣṭhasāra*, which he prepared in 1656–57. In the introduction to this text Kavīndra celebrates his learning in the Sanskrit knowledge systems: "the four Vedas and their meanings; the six *vedāṅgas*, on which he has given lectures; *nyāya, vedānta, mīmāṃsā, vaiśeṣika, sāṃkhya, pātañjala*, on which he has cleared up all doubts and confusions. He has taught *nyāya* and so on repeatedly, and written many works on *sāhitya*." Then he adds, "He lived first on the banks of the Godāvarī, and then came to live in Kāśī. He is a Ṛgvedin of the Āśvalāyana *śākhā* [school]—and he has composed the *Jñānsār* in the vernacular."[32] Kavīndra's celebrating his Sanskrit learning in the introduction to a vernacular text implies less pride in his multi-lingualism, as one might suppose, than condescension toward the *bhāṣā*. This is confirmed elsewhere in his oeuvre, where a clear note of unease in writing in the vernacular can be heard. He actually uses the term *lāj* (shame) in the *Kavīndrakalpalatā*, a collection of his *bhāṣākavitā*, or vernacular poetry:

> One feels ashamed to compose in the vernacular
> It was only for the sake of others that this book was written.

> bhāṣā karat āvati hai lāj
> kīnai graṁth parāe kāj.[33]

Whatever we may make of this vernacular anxiety, however, what is not in doubt is that for Kavīndra, Brajbhasha was a language of poetry, not science; nothing of the vast scholarship he claimed was ever transmuted into the language, with the sole exception of the text in hand, a work, as he calls it, of "Upanishadic" wisdom comparable to the other kinds of theological poems mentioned earlier.[34]

What the case of Kavīndra and Brajbhasha more generally suggests are the clear and untranscendable limits of vernacular textualization in the early modern period. Aside from poetics, which was crucial for the constitution of the "illustrious vernaculars" as such, the central concerns of the Sanskrit thought-world—and these constitute the central concerns of science and scholarly thought of precolonial India outside the world of Persian—remained almost entirely locked in the Sanskrit language. In linguistic philosophy, hermeneu-

tics, logic and epistemology, jurisprudence and moral reflection, or other disciplines (and the situation seems only marginally more favorable in life science and astral science), no original work whatsoever seems to have been composed in Brajbhasha. In fact not one of the standard Sanskrit works—the classical foundational text, commentary, exegesis, or exposition (*sūtra, vṛtti, bhāṣya, vārtika*), or any of the great independent (*prakaraṇa*) treatises—appears ever to have been made available in translation before the colonial period.

Sanskrit Language Ideology and the Character of Early Modern Science

The exclusion of the vernacular from the realm of scientific discourse has deep roots, I suggested earlier, in a complex language ideology. Sometimes this theory is formulated by way of a simple typology, articulated already in the prevernacular world in Bhoja's early eleventh-century treatise on literature, *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*: "Words with unitary meaning constitute a unit of discourse [*vākyam*]. There are three species of such discourse: Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Apabhramsha. As for Sanskrit discourse, it is of three types: relating to revelation, to the seers, and to the world. . . . Discourse relating to the world has two subtypes: *kāvya* [literature] and *śāstra* [systematic thought]." The world of written discourse as a whole is here radically restricted to nonregional languages. Sanskrit occupies the domain of science, to the exclusion of all others; Prakrit and Apabhramsha, which Bhoja goes on to describe solely in sociolinguistic terms, are shown to be restricted in their usage entirely to poetry.[35] As the *Tuḥfat al Hind* again shows, this tripartite division was tenacious and remained alive more than half a millennium after Bhoja, but with this change: that Brajbhasha (Bhakha) replaces Apabhramsha as the third language of literature.[36]

More instructive than this kind of typological presentation, which carries a second-order pragmatic dimension (as if simply reporting what the world of textual production consisted of), are the philosophical arguments that have a primary force in buttressing constraints on the production of science in the vernacular. Central here is the episteme mentioned earlier that links grammatical correctness and truth, the axiom of intrinsic Sanskrit veracity—and intrinsic vernacular mendacity. But a range of other, more abstract tenets of Sanskrit language philosophy also enters into the mix. One was the old notion found in *vyākaraṇa* (language analysis and grammar) that non-Sanskrit lan-

guage is able to exercise *śakti* (signifying power) only by the mediation of the original Sanskrit from which the vernacular was believed to derive and which was somehow thought (but in a way never explained) to be recognized in the process of communication. Whatever is sayable in the vernacular, this implies, has already been said, and said more clearly, in Sanskrit.

Counterarguments were raised against this position in the early modern era, such as those of the important linguistic philosopher Kauṇḍa (or Koṇḍa) Bhaṭṭa (fl. 1625), nephew of the celebrated grammarian Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, in his *Bṛhadvaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* (which exists in an abridged version as well, the *Sāra*), a commentary cum exposition of his uncle's *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana*.[37] There are a number of important new (or newly clarified) ideas that Kauṇḍa offers; note in particular his view that it is precisely Sanskrit's cosmopolitan presence that in the eyes of previous writers endowed it alone with the capacity of the direct signification:

[According to the "new logician," against whom the "new grammarian" Kauṇḍa is arguing,] signifying power is found only in Sanskrit. It cannot exist in vernacular words even though the putative communicative exchange in the vernacular may be identical to what is found in Sanskrit. This is so because the vernaculars vary across regions [whereas Sanskrit words are thought to be everywhere the same]. . . . However, given the absence of any decisive argument one way or the other, we must conclude that vernacular language, too, possesses the power of signifying directly. Nor would this lead to any lack of parsimony [i.e., the need to postulate multiple words— which is to say, multiple spellings of a single word—that all directly express the same meaning] since it is impossible to avoid attributing signifying power to Marathi [*mahārāṣṭrabhāṣā*] no less than Sanskrit. This is so because Marathi, too, remains self-identical in every single region. [*Sāra*: Like Sanskrit the vernacular of Maharashtra and all others are everywhere one and the same.][38] Thus, because there is no conclusive evidence for exclusion in the case of other languages, the rejection of signifying power with respect to any single one of the vernaculars is itself refuted. Indeed, even in the case of Sanskrit conclusive evidence for exclusion is absent. [*Sāra*: If by "conclusive evidence" were meant acceptance by the learned everywhere that a given form is correct, then even in the case of Sanskrit there might be incorrect words, since the word *śava* is used as a verb of motion among the Kambojas (i.e., in part of today's Afghanistan), and as a noun meaning corpse in Āryāvarta (Domain of the Aryans, i.e., India), according to the *Mahābhāṣya* (Great Commentary on Pāṇini's Grammar).]

One might argue further that it is not the fact of a language's being Sanskrit or a vernacular that determines whether or not it has signifying power, but rather its orthographic stability, which [in the case of the vernaculars] is everywhere variable. But this would hardly differ from the case of Sanskrit synonyms: *ghaṭa* and *kalaśa* [are spelled differently but mean the exact same thing, "pot"]. Given this, the one [Sanskrit] cannot entail that signifying power in the other [the vernacular] is a false attribution. [*Sāra*: Moreover, even if one were to agree that the vernaculars are marked by variation and argue that it is orthography that defines a word as such, one could reply as follows: The variable orthography in the vernacular is like the variability in Sanskrit with respect to synonyms (that is, various spellings of a single vernacular word all mean the same thing, just as various spellings in Sanskrit in the case of synonyms all mean the same thing); what is the difference between the two that allows us to count the latter as correct and the former as incorrect?] It is precisely because non-Sanskrit language can have signifying power that the *Kāvyaprakāśa* (Light on Literature) quotes a *Prakrit* verse to illustrate a case of aesthetic implication of the expressed meaning.[39]

It is this radically modernist position represented by Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa that came under attack from the widely influential Varanasi intellectual Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa (also, let us note, a Maharashtrian Brahman writer). Kamalākara reiterates the old position in *mīmāṃsā* language philosophy (though tinged in fact with *navyanyāya*) when arguing that the very capacity of vernacular language to produce meaning is a pure illusion, since authentic meaning presupposes language that does not change—that is, Sanskrit:

The new intellectuals [*navya*] hold that [inherently expressive] words and sentences must exist in dialect, that is, in vernacular-language texts, as well as in [newly coined] technical terms and proper names, because these actually do communicate verbal knowledge. These thinkers, however, fail to grasp the logic in the argument that "a multiplicity of equally expressive speech forms cannot be logically posited" [PMS 1.3.26]. Nor do they understand that, by thereby rendering grammar itself irrelevant and accepting as valid words and meanings in use among the *mlecchas* [the uncivilized, those who stand outside of Sanskrit culture], they are destroying the Veda. There cannot exist in dialectal words such as *gāvya* [instead of Skt. *gauḥ*, "cow"] the expressive power conferred by divine will, because these dialectal words have no stable form [whereas the words stamped by God's will, i.e., Sanskrit words, are invariable]. . . . In short, [if one accepts direct signification in vernacular words] one would have to attribute the power of

signification to the sounds of seashells and bells. By the same token, the vernacular can be said to possess real words only in one of two ways: either by the illusion of their being expressive in themselves, or through the presence of the grammatically correct Sanskrit words that they imply. Words are actually changeless and eternal, because the phonemes of which they are composed are such.[40]

Another, related axiom is the *mīmāṃsā* postulate of the natural and uncreated (*autpattika*) connection of signifier and signified, along with its theory of reference, whereby all substantives are believed to refer to class properties (*ākṛti*), or indeed universals (*jāti*), and not individuals (*vyakti*), which they connote only secondarily, and each signified is believed to have only one signifier.[41] We cannot scrutinize these theorems here, but what they imply for vernacular knowledge should be obvious: in a world of nonarbitrary and singular language it is impossible for any language but Sanskrit to make scientific or other sense; non-Sanskrit languages would not be referring to the universally real since they would be using false words, and if they were using real words (what are called *tatsamas*, or vernacular words identical to Sanskrit) they would be completely redundant.

Other old but still functioning components of Sanskrit language ideology persisted; these may have been bent in the early modern period, but they were not broken. Consider first the discussion of the well-known *pikanemā-dhikaraṇa* by Khaṇḍadeva in his remarkable comprehensive treatise on *mīmāṃsā*, the *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*.[42] The larger context of this topic (the *smṛti-pāda*, or Section on the Authority of Tradition), to characterize it generally, is the grounds for the authority claimed by various Sanskrit knowledge systems per se. The specific question at issue in the topic concerns the words *pika* and *nema*, non-Sanskrit words present (or held to be present) in Vedic texts and yet having no currency among *ārya*s themselves, but only among *mleccha*s: Are the latter competent to explain the meaning of their own language, or must the signification of such words be determined by the application of Sanskrit knowledge techniques, especially etymology?[43] To be sure, Khaṇḍadeva accepts the *mīmāṃsā* tenet: the communicative practices of the *mleccha*s can be shown to be beginningless, for words such as *pika* and *nema* cannot be proven to be corrupted either phonologically or semantically (unlike other lexemes, such as *pīlu*, that are current among both *ārya*s and *mleccha*s but in radically different senses, and where, therefore, the suspicion of corruption among the latter cannot be removed).[44] "This leads us to assume that their linguistic usages do express meaning. Accordingly, their practices, too, [no less

than those of the *āryas*,] should be authoritative in determining the signification of words."

It is to Khaṇḍadeva's *pūrvapakṣa*, or prima facie argument, however, that I call special attention. *Mīmāṃsā* is celebrated among pandits for avoiding the straw man and mounting the strongest arguments possible against its own tenets (since, as Bhoja says [*ŚP* 742.3], the stronger his adversary, the more ennobled becomes the victor). There is little reason to doubt that the following position as formulated by Khaṇḍadeva, constructed only to be rejected though it may be, seemed entirely reasonable in the seventeenth-century Sanskrit thought-world:

Lacking education [*abhiyoga*] the *mlecchas* are observed to corrupt [*viplu-*] language by using incorrect [*asādhu*] speech items, and so they have no competence to determine the real phonetics of words [*śabdatattvāvadhā-raṇa*]. By the same token, neither have they competence to determine their semantics [*tadarthāvadhāraṇa*], because of their mistaken use of words like *pīlu* and so on. One cannot argue that since we do not find any corruption in words such as *pika* that it should be possible to accept the meaning attributed to them by *mlecchas*. For those words, too, are in fact phonologically corrupted [*apabhraṣṭa*], insofar as only the stems [and not the full inflections] are used. What the *mlecchas* are therefore employing are words *similar to* the Sanskrit words used in the Veda, not those very same Vedic words themselves. And we cannot, on the basis of mere similarity, conjecture the meaning of the words *pika* and so on [as found in] Sanskrit texts from the meaning of the words known to *mlecchas*. Were one to base oneself on mere similarity, one could wind up assuming that, for example, the word *śālā* [room] expresses the same meaning as *mālā* [garland]. In his *Tantravārtika* Kumārila considered at length the difficulties of trying to conjecture, by means of similarity or the interpolation of additional phonemes, the Sanskrit words that lie at the origin of words used in the Āndhra and Dravida languages and thus their capacity to signify what the original Sanskrit words signify. He showed accordingly how just for those two languages it is impossible to determine the words and meanings in any systematic way.[45] This is a fortiori the case with respect to languages of those even more remote than the Āndhras and the Dravidas, such as the Pārasi [Persians] and the Romakas ["people of Rome," i.e., Constantinople or Istanbul? Or the French, or the Portuguese?]. Accordingly, the knowledge of *mlecchas* has as little authority in the determination of linguistic meaning as it does in the determination of *dharma* and *adharma*.[46]

What is perhaps most remarkable here, amid the many older arguments, is the fact that the question of whether Persians and Europeans were competent to understand their own languages was still being seriously discussed in the 1660s.

Elsewhere in his work, too, what Khaṇḍadeva chooses to recover from early discussions suggests that his general attitude toward language and sociality retains many traces of the archaic. Here is one example:

> The following objection has been raised: It may be granted that the [beginningless] communicative practice of their ancestors is authoritative for the *mlecchas* [which would validate their own linguistic competence], but since they are disallowed from hearing the language of the Veda, and *āryas* are prohibited from speaking with them or learning their speech, there is no possibility for *āryas* to come to know the meanings familiar to the *mlecchas*. But this objection has no force. *Mlecchas* might have learned Sanskrit from bilingual *āryas* [*dvaibhāṣika*] who violated the prohibition, and these *mlecchas* might have taught to *āryas* the meanings of words known only to them. Thus there is no insurmountable obstacle in the *āryas'* acquiring the requisite linguistic knowledge.[47]

On matters of true knowledge, communication outside the domain of Sanskrit was clearly still viewed as transgressive and exceptional in the *imaginaire* of Sanskrit scholarship. As far as the vernacular in particular is concerned, Khaṇḍadeva does acknowledge a communicative space for it, but it is tellingly narrow. When considering the injunction noted earlier to employ only correct Sanskrit (*sādhūn evābhibhāṣeta*, "One should use only grammatically correct words"), he argues, in what appears to be an open-minded way, that the rule has reference only to the domain of sacrificial activity; it does not constitute a general moral principle and thus does not militate against use of the vernacular—that is, the degenerated (*apabhraṣṭa*) Sanskrit words thought to be the source of the vernaculars—in other contexts: "For these degenerated Sanskrit words are used by learned men of all regions [*sakaladeśīyāḥ śiṣṭāḥ*] in their everyday activities as well as in chanting the name and virtues of God [*hari*]." His general conclusion is that there is no primary human end (*puruṣārtha*) attaching to the prohibition on ungrammaticality (or dialectism, or vernacularity, *asādhubhāṣaṇa*): "While ungrammaticality can impair a sacrifice it cannot impair other Vedic activity nor pose a direct threat to human welfare [*puruṣasya pratyavāya*]." This would seem to open the door to a wide range of vernacular practices, but it is surely significant that Khaṇḍadeva restricts this to *vyavahārakāla* and *saṃkīrtana*, the pragmatic and devotional, ac-

tivities outside the realm of science, learning, and scholarship. In general his position on language is as inflexible as other *mīmāṃsakas* of his day, such as Dinakara Bhaṭṭa, with whom Khaṇḍadeva directly agrees on the question of Persian when he states:

> However, there does indeed exist a prohibition of a general moral scope [*puruṣārtha*; rather than one restricted to ritual, *kratvartha*] applying to words of barbarian [*bārbara*] and other languages, since there is a scriptural prohibition against learning them at all: "One should not learn a *mleccha* language [*na mlecchabhāṣāṃ śikṣeta*]." With regard to this statement there are no grounds such as primary context [as there is in the case of another scriptural prohibition, "One is not to barbarize" (*na mlecchitavai*)] for setting aside the conventional meaning of the word *mleccha* [which he elsewhere identifies as Pārasika and Romaka] [and interpreting the word as referring more narrowly to ungrammatical Sanskrit]. Thus the prohibition on barbarian and other languages only is purely of a general moral sort, whereas the prohibition on other language [i.e., *apabhraṣṭa* Sanskrit, as expressed in *na mlecchitavai*] relates to sacrificial activity and that only.[48]

The actual degree of Sanskrit-Persian intercommunication in the period 1550–1750, like so many other questions raised here, awaits systematic study.[49] We do know that, whereas intellectual intercourse among astronomers may have been relatively relaxed and some scholars, such as the Jain Siddhicandra, celebrated their skills in Persian (*yāvanībhāṣā*), other sources substantiate Khaṇḍadeva on the resistance among most Sanskrit intellectuals (Jains aside) to the use of Persian.[50] Among Kashmiri Brahmans there even emerged a new caste division between the *kārkun* (bureaucrats) who learned Persian and entered the service of the sultans, and the *bhāṣbhaṭas* (language scholars) who maintained a Sanskrit cultural identity. In the description of Maharashtra in the contemporaneous *Viśvaguṇādarśacampū* of Veṅkaṭādhvarin, scorn is heaped on those who, at the time of life they should be practicing Vedic recitation, do nothing but learn Persian. But also derided are those (Tengalai Śrīvaiṣṇavas are intended, though Kavīndra might just as well have been included) "who senselessly bother with vernacular texts [*bhāṣāprabandha*] when the Veda, source of all human values, is at hand. You don't run off to a cowherd's hut for a glass of milk when standing on the shore of the milk ocean."[51]

To be sure, at precisely the same moment others appeared to be speaking in favor of a *bhāṣā* competence even on the most transcendent plane. Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara, for example, the celebrated editor of and commentator on the

Mahābhārata, argued in his *Śivatāṇḍavatantraṭīkā* not only that tantric texts should be numbered among the fourteen knowledge sources and so be adjudged Vedic in origin and hence true knowledge, but that the power of their mantras even when composed in the vernacular (*bhāṣā*) was undiminished:

> Their actual sequence of phonemes may not be Vedic, but their meanings are Vedic, and it is precisely this that gives them their efficacy. And it is perfectly possible that Vyāsa, Śabara,[52] and others were able to set out the meaning of Vedic texts in vernacular as well as in Sanskrit language, and to compose texts through the power of their asceticism. The sequence of phonemes arranged by them could have likewise the entire efficacy of [Vedic] mantras. Therefore, the Vedic origins of . . . the vernacular mantras is proved beyond doubt. It is precisely as a result of the differences [from Vedic mantras] in the sequence of their phonemes that both higher and lower castes, as appropriate, have the right to pronounce the phonemes.[53]

Yet there is an archaic exception to this, as it were, modernist innovation that is almost too obvious for comment: for knowledge to be true it must have Vedic affiliation, and even to claim vernacular truth meant to set forth the claim, as Nīlakaṇṭha of course does here, in Sanskrit.

The Case of Europe

I noted at the beginning of this essay the remarkable asymmetry between literary and scientific vernacularization in India and Europe. It is especially the parallel in literary language change and the linkage often assumed between the development of scientific and literary discourse that make the apparent resistance to scientific vernacularization in India so puzzling. I have written about literary vernacularization elsewhere and need state here only that the commonalities, conceptual, social, and chronological, in the emergence of the vernaculars in the two regions are astonishing.[54] As for the vernacularization of scientific knowledge in western Europe, this commenced in the natural sciences in the mid-sixteenth century with Peletier writing in French on algebra (1554) and had gained powerful momentum by the time Galileo published his *Discorsi* in Italian (1638); in philosophy Bacon's *The Advancement of Learning* (1605) and Descartes's *Discours de la méthode* (1637) are among the most important early works.[55] Latin long retained its appeal, of course. Scientists from Copernicus and Kepler to Newton and Gauss continued to use the language (though philosophers had abandoned it entirely by the time of Kant) because

of its supposed universality, stability, prestige, and demonstrated communicative capacity. But the trend toward science in the demotic idiom was irreversible.

Sometimes the choice of the vernacular was not in fact a choice but a matter of practical necessity; Peletier is said to have used French simply because he was ignorant of Latin. Sometimes the use of the vernacular was an attempt to achieve a certain new kind of diffusion of a national-popular sort, a goal pursued, it seems, by Descartes with his *Discours*, despite the substantial conceptual challenge of presenting a discourse on universal reason in a nonuniversal language.[56] The role of the new academies (the Académie française was established two years before the *Discours* was published, virtually the moment, half a world away, when Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa was arguing out the essential incoherence of the vernacular), and more largely, of the knowledge initiatives of the nascent nation-state, are pertinent factors here too; note that with Bacon science itself became a state enterprise.[57] Other motives for the vernacularization of science, as conceived by the agents themselves, include the confirmation by language choice of the idea of *translatio studiorum et imperii*; popular disclosure of useful information hitherto kept secret; the education of women and aristocratic officials. Pertinent also are the arguments, ever more forcefully made, that favored the supposed natural language, especially its facility and putative transparence, over the artificial classical, something already evident in Dante, who proclaimed in 1300 what no one in Europe had ever proclaimed before: *nobilior est vulgaris*, "More noble [than Latin] is the vernacular."[58]

Several hard questions are raised by thinking through the cases of Europe and India together. With respect to the vernacularization of literature as a cultural and political process, similar developments occurred more or less simultaneously in both Europe and India to produce, each autonomously, its own brand of modernity, on the one hand national, on the other, for want of a better term, *deshi*. But the vernacularization of scientific discourse never happened in precolonial India, certainly not for most of the core disciplines of the dominant intellectual order, and this needs to be explained.[59]

One's first impulse is to interpret this commitment to Sanskrit as obscurantism or blind traditionalism, a practical enactment of Sanskrit's archaic language ideology—in short, as failure. To be sure few of the factors identified for European scientific vernacularization were present in early modern South Asia. Sanskrit competence among intellectuals never deteriorated to the degree that made writing in the vernacular unavoidable. No national-popular projects, let alone institutions, that instrumentalized and rationalized cultural

practices were ever developed. No polity ever sought to draw on culture to make its language the *compañera del imperio*. But these are again absences; is there a more positive interpretation?

Here I am put in mind of a remark made by the historical sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt regarding an old text of Werner Sombart's, *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?* For Eisenstadt it is just as reasonable or even more so to ask, instead, Why was there socialism in Europe? Similarly we might want to turn the tables of our assumptions and ask, not why India failed to vernacularize science but why Europe did, and conversely what intellectuals in South Asia sought to achieve by their choice to remain transregional. I have elsewhere sought to make sense of the continuing commitment to Sanskrit on the part of late precolonial intellectuals as an attempt to reinvigorate and sustain an old ecumenical cultural order in a changing world where a middle-class, national-cultural regime was not yet a historical possibility.[60] Perhaps, in accordance with the Eisenstadt principle, we ought to proceed even further against the obvious grain. Not only is it the case that few of the factors present in early modern Europe are relevant to India, but deeper or wiser prompt-ings may also have been in play. If, unlike literature, systematic knowledge in general and science in particular are not idiographic (let alone ethnographic) but nomothetic, then the cultural nationalization of science and scientific lan-guage in early modern Europe turns out actually to have been a curious ex-periment—and indeed it has largely now been abandoned.[61] Modern supra-national communication forms, whether transnational English or the abstract language of mathematics, constitute a Latin *redivivus*, and we now think of "German chemistry" or "French mathematics" not as science but as chap-ters in the history of science. Might therefore a conceptual "provincialization of Europe," as Dipesh Chakrabarty puts it, permit us to think of the Sanskrit domination of science as a good universalism, and thus not as a failure accord-ing to the norms of European modernity but, according to an Indian ethos, as a kind of civilizational achievement?

Abbreviations

AMKV   *Adhvaramīmāṃsākutūhalavṛtti*
Bhyvs   *Bhāṣāyogavāsiṣṭhasāra*
BhD   *Bhāṭṭadinakara*
MK   *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*
NS   *Nyāyasudhā*

PMS   *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra*
ŚD   *Śāstradīpikā*
ŚP   *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*
TV   *Tantravārtika*
VGĀC *Viśvaguṇādarśacampū*
VMP   *Vīramitrodaya Paribhāṣāprakāśa*

Notes

1. Pollock, *The Language of the Gods in the World of Men*, 39–74.

2. These two concerns are well described for Europe by Chartier and Corsi, *Sciences et langues en Europe*, 12.

3. See the learned and challenging account in Staal, "The Sanskrit of Science." The true question in the history of Indian science for Staal is not why it never vernacularized (an issue not in fact raised at all), but why India failed to invent an artificial language for science, except in linguistics, to which it remained confined. The issue of language medium is raised here (as it is elsewhere) only in passing.

4. Further information may be obtained at the project's website, http://www .columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pollock/sks. In addition to the materials available there, "Working Papers on Sanskrit Knowledge Systems on the Eve of Colonialism I" was published in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 30, no. 5 (2002); "Working Papers . . . II" in 33, no. 1 (2005), and "Theory and Method in Indian Intellectual History" in 36, nos. 5–6 (2008).

5. With respect to the latter, in addition to the papers by Y. Bronner and myself on the project website, see the summaries of the presentations of Bronner, M. Deshpande, L. McCrea, and C. Minkowski in American Oriental Society, *Abstracts of Communications*.

6. A preliminary synthesis is offered in Pollock, "Ends of Man at the End of Premodernity."

7. For an account of an experimental seminar, see Pollock, "Comparative Intellectual Histories of the Early Modern World."

8. See, respectively, Cunningham and Williams, "De-centering the 'Big Picture,'" 420 n., and Chartier and Corsi, *Sciences et langues en Europe*.

9. *Na vedaśāstrād anyat tu kiṃcic chāstraṃ hi vidyate | niḥsṛtaṃ sarvaśāstraṃ tu vedaśāstrāt sanātanāt* (cited in VMP, 20). For the *vidyāsthānas*, see Pollock, "The Idea of Śāstra in Traditional India." An influential enumeration is found in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (perhaps fifth century): "The four Vedas, the [six] *vedāṅgas* (language analysis, phonetics, etymology, metrics, astral science, ritual science), *mīmāṃsā, nyāya, purāṇa, dharmaśāstra* are the fourteen sciences. These number eighteen with the addition of *āyurveda, dhanurveda, gāndharva,* and *arthaśāstra*" (*Viṣṇupurāṇa* 3.6.28–29, ed. Rajendra Nath Sarma, Delhi, 1985).

10. TV 164, 1.3.12, lines 9–15 (slightly rearranging the verse and the prose that glosses it); 166, line 2; compare NS, 236.10. Kumārila curiously ignores the fact that the Buddhists had turned to Sanskrit for both scriptural and scholarly purposes some four to five centuries before his time.

11. BhD fol. 41v, lines 1–2 (see also ŚD, 47: *sādhūn śabdān satyaparyāyān*, "'correct language,' i.e., truthful"). Injunctions such as *nāsādhu vadet* ("One should not speak ungrammatically"), *sādhubhir bhāṣeta* ("One should use grammatical speech"), *na brāhmaṇena mlecchitavai* ("A Brahman must not barbarize his speech"), and *na mlecchabhāṣāṃ śikṣeta* ("One should not learn a *mleccha*'s language") are often discussed together, as in the TV and NS on the *vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa* (PMS 1.3.24–29). As we see below, early modern *mīmāṃsāka*s like Khaṇḍadeva discriminate among different realms of application of these *vidhi*s.

12. A consideration of the place of *navyanyāya* terminology in the early modern *mīmāṃsā* is offered in McCrea, "Novelty of Form and Novelty of Substance in Seventeenth-century Mīmāṃsā," and a useful general account is in Staal, "The Sanskrit of Science," 79–88. For the ridicule the *navyanyāya* style earned in some quarters of the seventeenth-century intelligentsia, see *Viśvaguṇādarśacampū* v. 555bc: *paraṃ vāco vaśyān katipayapadaughān vidadhataḥ / sabhāyāṃ vācāṭāḥ śrutikaṭu raṭanto ghaṭapaṭān*, "The [logicians] use a few terms—but use them in a flood—that are entirely dependent on language itself [i.e., metalinguistic?], and in the halls of debate stridently bang their pots and flap their cloths" (the two items adduced as standard examples in *navyanyāya* syllogisms; my thanks to A. Wezler for correcting an earlier oversight of mine).

13. On the former, see Pollock, "India in the Vernacular Millennium"; the latter is examined in detail in Pollock, *The Language of the Gods in the World of Men*, 283–329.

14. This is so for several reasons. The work itself is multilayered; the date of the literature it refers to is itself undetermined; the date of a grammar need not be contemporaneous with the language it describes, as Akalaṅka Deva's work shows; its commentaries do not appear until the twelfth century. See Swamy, "The Date of the Tolkāppiam"; Takahashi, *Tamil Love Poetry and Poetics*, 15–29.

15. On the dating of the *Āndhraśabdacintāmaṇi*, see Rao, "Multiple Literary Cultures in Telugu." The history of Malayalam stands apart; see Freeman, "Rubies and Coral."

16. The exception is a brief account of Marathi morphology in the *Pañcavārtik* of Bhīṣmācārya sometime in the fourteenth century. On the vernacular glossators, the old essay by Printz, "Bhāṣā-Wörter in Nīlakaṇṭha's Bhāratabhāvadīpa usw," remains useful. The north-south difference in grammaticization is discussed in Pollock, *The Language of the Gods in the World of Men*, chapter 9.

17. See Busch, this volume.

18. This work is complemented by what appears to be one of the earliest vernacular texts on polity, the *Beddanīti* (perhaps as early as the fourteenth century; see Wagoner, "*Iqtā* and *Nāyaṃkara*"), but except in literary texts the tradition of vernacular political thought seems not to have been continued.

19. We thus find one Vyāsa Keśavarāma composing a bilingual Gujarati-Sanskrit

medical glossary, while Mahārāja Pratāpasiṃha of Jaipur wrote in Marwari and then translated his own work into Sanskrit verse and Hindi prose (Dominic Wujastyk, personal communication); for the situation in Brajbhasha, see below. In the Siddha tradition of Tamil Nadu, oral transmission was the rule.

20. On the *Vivekasindhu*, see Tulpule, *Classical Marāṭhī Literature*, 316.

21. To be sure in virtually every case in South (and Southeast) Asia the inaugural use of the vernaculars was entirely pragmatic — in the business end of inscriptions — and such usage did leave later textual traces in some regional traditions. See Pollock, *The Language of the Gods in the World of Men*, especially 121.

22. Literally, "the language in which composition is done of *a'lum* and *fanun*" (sciences and painting, music, crafts, etc., i.e., *kalā*). See Ziauddin, *A Grammar of the Braj Bhākhā*, 34 (53 of the Persian text).

23. I owe a number of references in this section to Allison Busch and profited greatly from discussions with her on the issues raised here.

24. Pandey, *Hastalikhit Hindī Granthasūcī*. These findings are largely confirmed by the two-volume manuscript catalogue of Varma et al.'s *Hastalikhit Hindī Granthoṁ kī Vivarṇātmak Sūcī*. No works at all in the *bhāṣā* are listed for *vyākaraṇa, mīmāṃsā, nyāya* (with the exception of two recent *ṭīkās* on the last), or any other philosophical system save *pātañjalayoga* (two or three manuscripts); *āyurveda* and *jyotiḥśāstra* are more substantially represented, but their numbers remain small.

25. There is also listed a *Rājanīticandrikā* (vol. 3.3420, 3421), but I have been unable to examine the manuscript. Note also the *Devīdāsa kṛta Rājanīti* and *Nathurāma kṛta Rājanīti*, two works on the syllabus of the Brajbhāṣā Pāṭhaśālā discussed by Mallison (this volume).

26. Only *vaidika* works are found: *Caturvedasatśāstramata* of one Balirām "Bali" (vol. 1.30, unpublished); Sundaradās's *Jñānsamudra* (*Advaitasiddhāntanirūpaṇ*) (verse, often printed); the anonymous *Bodhadarpaṇ* (an exegesis of the *Puruṣasūkta*) (vol. 1.42); *Vedāntaratnamañjuṣā* of one Puruṣottamācārya (1.52); *Sāṃkhyaśāstra*, anon. (1.56) (all unpublished).

27. See Busch, *Poetry of Kings*, chapter 3. As she notes, it is a measure of the under-development of our knowledge that several texts of Cintāmaṇi, the most important Brajbhasha poetician of the seventeenth century, remain unpublished or virtually inaccessible.

28. The *Siddāntabodh* is available in *Jasvant Siṃh Granthāvalī*, edited by Mishra. (For other, comparable texts, see Varma et al., *Hastalikhit Hindī Granthoṁ kī Vivarṇātmak Sūcī*.) The fact that, in the case of another work of the king's, the *Ānandavilāsa*, a Sanskrit translation was prepared contemporaneously (32) raises in a pointed way questions about language, communication, and intellectual community of the epoch about which at present we know next to nothing.

29. For Indrajit, see McGregor, "The Progress of Hindi," and for the full exposition, McGregor, *The Language of Indrajit of Orcha*; for Keśavdās and his commentators, Busch, *Poetry of Kings*, chapter 3; for Rāyasiṃha, Pingree, *From Astral Omens to Astrology*, 93.

30. Details are in Pollock, "The Death of Sanskrit," 407–8; see also Pollock, "New Intellectuals in Seventeenth-century India," 20–21.

31. A collection of Vaiṣṇava *bhajans* titled *Kīrtanapraṇālīpadasaṃgraha* is ascribed to a Jagannātha, and a "Jagannātha Kavirai" is mentioned as a composer of *dhrupads* in the late seventeenth-century *Anūpasangītaratnākara* (Delvoye, "Les chants *dhrupad*," 169). (The *Kīrtanapraṇālīpadasaṃgraha* exists in a single unpublished manuscript, once in the temple library in Kankroli and now reportedly in Baroda and inaccessible to scholars.)

32. Bh YVS vv. 3–4.

33. Divākar, *Kavīndracandrikā*, 34, citing the *Kavīndrakalpalatā*. In the citation from the *Samarasāra* (an unpublished work on astral science; in Divākar, *Kavīndracandrikā*, 34), *samarasāra bhāṣā racyo, chamiyo budh aparādh*, we may have instead merely the conventional apologia.

34. Note too that among the more than two thousand manuscripts in his library only two or three, on *vaidya*, are in the vernacular (see Sastry, *Kavīndrācārya's List*).

35. ŚP 165. The Jain canon, in Prakrit, was obviously not considered *śāstra* by Bhoja; Prakrit was rarely used by Jains (or anyone else) for scholarly purposes after the second or third century. (A work like the *Mahārthamañjarī* of Maheśvarānanda from twelfth-century Madurai, which uses Maharashtri Prakrit for its *kārikās*, is a self-acknowledged anomaly.) Apabhramsha figures occasionally in tantric philosophical texts but typically only for *saṃgrahaślokas* (in, e.g., Abhinavagupta's *Tantrasāra*).

36. "The people of India have a number of languages, but those in which books and poetical works may be composed . . . are three," and he goes on to list Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Brajbhasha (Ziauddin, *A Grammar of the Braj Bhākhā by Mīrzā Khān*, 34).

37. Some of the following discussion is adapted from Pollock, "New Intellectuals in Seventeenth-century India," 27–29. Even while defending the autonomous expressivity of Marathi, Kauṇḍa wrote not a single line in the language.

38. The *Prabhā* commentary adds: "That is, all vernaculars produce meaning in one form only. None of them varies across regions, for when it does become truly transformed, it turns into another language."

39. Which demonstrates that other important authorities hold *śakti* to exist in *bhāṣā* (*Bṛhadvaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* 218, 220; *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, 341–42 = Benares Sanskrit Series edition, 248–49: "Thus, because there is no conclusive evidence for exclusion in the case of [lit., with] other languages" — that is, because just as in the case of Sanskrit, so in the case of the vernaculars the learned use one and the same form everywhere — "the rejection of signifying power with respect to any single one [of the vernaculars] is itself refuted" (*bhāṣāntarair vinigamanāvirahān naikatra śaktir iti parāstam*). The Prakrit citation from the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, an important early twelfth-century text on poetics, is chapter 2, v. 6 (*māe gharovaaraṇam*). This notwithstanding, it is more likely that Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa held Māhārāṣṭrī and Marathi to be related, rather than that he meant by *mahārāṣṭrabhāṣā* the Prakrit (which for a thousand years had been called *māhārāṣṭrī*). The presence of signifying power in non-Sanskrit is asserted

by another *navya* grammarian of the preceding generation, Annam Bhaṭṭa (according to his subcommentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* cited in Coward and Kunjuni Raja, *The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, 237).

40. *Mīmāṃsākutūhalam* 77 ("dialect," *apabhraṃśa*; "vernacular-language texts," *bhāṣāprabandha*; "proper names and technical terms," *saṅketaśabda*). By and large this is the dominant position across disciplines, from logic (see Mahādeva, *Nyāyakaustubha Śabdapariccheda*, 549) to literary criticism (*Alaṅkārakaustubha* of Kavikarṇapūra [ca. 1600, Navadvip], 30–31). Supporters of the new grammarians seem few and far between, though consider the following comments of Gāgā Bhaṭṭa in his commentary on the *Candrāloka* v. 4. With regard to Mammaṭa's by then canonical definition of poetry as *nirdoṣā . . . vāk*, or "faultless language," Gāgā remarks, "Some people hold that, even though faultless usage is absent from vernacular verse and the like (*bhāṣā-ślokādau*) given the presence there of phonological and morphological solecisms and so on (*cyutasaṃskṛtitva-*), people still apply the word 'literature' to it, and accordingly 'faultlessness' should be taken not as a defining property (*viśeṣaṇa*) of literature but as a secondary property (*upalakṣaṇa*)."

41. See PMS 1.3.26 (*anyāyaś cānekaśabdatvam*). It was precisely a proposition in European scholasticism comparable to the *autpattikasaṃbandha* that Descartes, the first great French philosophical vernacularizer, challenged with his proto-Saussurean declaration in *Le Monde*, "Les paroles, n'ayant aucune resemblance avec les choses qu'elles signifient" (quoted in Chartier and Corsi, *Sciences et langues en Europe*, 109).

42. MK 79–84, lines 1–16 (the *Kaustubha* was evidently prized by Kavīndra as well, who acquired a copy for inclusion in his library; see *Kavīndra's List* no. 368); see PMS 1.3.10.

43. The words in question, which are said to mean "cuckoo" and "half," respectively, are non-Indo-Aryan, perhaps Munda, though the argument could be and has been extended to non-Sanskrit as such.

44. Kumārila had argued that, with respect to a word like *pīlu* (meaning a type of tree in Sanskrit and elephant or ivory staff in some indeterminate but almost certainly non-Dravidian language), *ārya* usage, based on learning, is primary and authoritative, and *mleccha* usage is secondary and erroneous (TV 143–44, 1.3.9). Khaṇḍadeva addresses the question on 58–59 and concurs with Kumārila.

45. Kumārila's rather convoluted discussion of Draviḍa and other non-Sanskrit languages is found in TV 150–51. The *pūrvapakṣa* seems to claim that Dravidian dialectal pronunciations (*apabhāṣaṇa*) are mere copies (*pratirūpa*) of Sanskrit words, used with different (i.e., erroneous) meanings; if *āryas* were to try to restore the Sanskrit for such words, to make them accord with meanings current among Tamil users—if for instance Tamil *pā[m]p[u]* (snake) were to be derived from Sanskrit *pāpa* (evil) because snakes are wicked (lines 24–25)—such a procedure would consist of entirely arbitrary conjecture (*svacchandakalpanā*). The meaning of the putative original Sanskrit word can therefore be truly determined only on the basis of etymology. In his conclusion, as I read him, Kumārila demurs: "The corruptions in the vernaculars are so deep

that it is impossible to distinguish" the correct Sanskrit words and meanings from which they derive (*deśabhāṣāpabhraṃśapadāni hi viplutibhūyiṣṭhāni na śakyante vivektum*, TV 151, line 23). Note that Kumārila also refers to "Pārasika, Bārbara, Yavana, and Raumaka [*sic*] languages"; the seventeenth-century understanding of these terms, however, is likely to have been quite different.

46. MK 79, lines 15–80, line 3 (*pūrvapakṣa*). The *siddhānta* is found on 82, lines 10–23. As late as the early decades of the eighteenth century the south Indian *mīmāṃsāka* Vāsudeva Dīkṣita felt it necessary to exclude from the domain of solecism (largely *tadbhavas*) such Tamil words as *ayyā* and *appā*. These are not to be considered *asādhu* because they do not "share a similar form" with a correct word. *Tadbhavas* are produced by a failure to generate the correct Sanskrit form, and they convey meaning only by prompting recollection of that form, to which they bear a resemblance (incorrect *gāvi* leading to correct *gauḥ*). *Appā* and the like, however, are simply "a separate species" (*vijātīya*) of words (AMKV 1.3.24).

47. MK 82, lines 4–9 (see also TV 152, lines 5–6).

48. MK 132, lines 14–18 (discussed further in Pollock, "The *Bhāṭṭadinakara* of Dinakara Bhaṭṭa (1.3)").

49. Audrey Truschke's forthcoming dissertation (Columbia University), "Cosmopolitan Encounters: Sanskrit and Persian at the Mughal Court," promises to provide the first detailed account of the question for the early Mughal era.

50. On the astronomers, see Minkowski, "Astronomers and Their Reasons"; on Siddhicandra, see Pollock, "The Death of Sanskrit," 406.

51. See Kachru, *Kashmiri Literature*, 25, n.4; VGĀC 230, vv. 134. See also v. 89, where Brahmans of Kāśī who consort with Yavanas (Muslims) are criticized (see also vv. 96, 97).

52. The former is the compiler of the *Mahābhārata* and the *purāṇas*, the latter the author of a celebrated commentary on the PMS.

53. *Śivatāṇḍavatantraṭīkā* 2v–3r. I thank Christopher Minkowski of Oxford University, who provided me with his transcription of a manuscript of this work in his possession.

54. Pollock, "Cosmopolitan and Vernacular in History."

55. Note however that there were large-scale translation programs since the late Middle Ages. Nicole Oresme's French translation of Aristotle's *Ethics* of 1370 was the first complete version of an authentic Aristotelian work in any modern language. This of course intensified over the centuries: Tesauro's *La filosofia morale* (1670) saw twenty-seven editions over the course of the following century and translation into other vernaculars—as well as Latin (*The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*, 1282). Even earlier is Gossouin of Metz's *Image du Monde* (Lorraine, 1246), probably the oldest encyclopedic treatise written in a European vernacular. Such initiatives are entirely absent in the Indian context.

56. The issue is raised and explored in Derrida, "Languages and Institutions of Philosophy."

57. Gaukroger, *Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-modern Philosophy*, 160.

58. *De vulgari eloquentia* 1.4. See also the essay by Pantin, "Latin et langues vernaculaires," from whom I adopt a number of ideas in this paragraph. As she points out, there was no clear and invariant line of progression (for example, most of Galileo's students reverted to Latin), and no good explanations are available to account for this indirect route of the vernacular's eventual conquest. Even as French, Italian, and English became the principal vehicles of scientific expression, anomalies continue to be found, such as Latin treatises produced for local aristocratic environments and vernacular treatises destined for Europe-wide dissemination.

59. Colonialism and globalization have changed the rules for game of vernacular language science. I cannot address that here, but among the useful resources are Naregal, *Language Politics, Elites, and the Public Sphere* (the place of Marathi in nineteenth-century education in Maharashtra) and Minault, "Delhi College and Urdu" (the place of Urdu, with important remarks on the Vernacular Translation Society).

60. Pollock, "New Intellectuals in Seventeenth-century India," 30–31.

61. This was recognized to some degree from the start by European vernacular intellectuals like Bacon. The Latin translation of his *Advancement* (which he commissioned in 1607–8) was, he said, a book that "will live, and be a citizen of the world, as English books are not. . . . My end of putting it into Latin was to have it read everywhere." Similarly regarding the Latin translation of his *Essays*: "For I doe conceive, that the Latine Volume of them, (being the Universall Language) may last, as long as Bookes last" (quoted in Kiernan, *The Advancement of Learning*, liv).

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